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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
Appellee has raised several issues in its capacity as Cross-Appellant. But there 
remain just two issues. Other questions raised by Appellee hinge entirely upon how 
this Court determines only two issues. 
FIRST ISSUES — PHASE ONE OF THE TRIAL: 
Did the trial court err in concluding that the 1998 trust "restatement" did not fully 
revoke the 1987 original trust? and 
Was the trial court's conclusion on that issue solely one of interpretation of law 
or was that issue first resolved through Findings of Fact? 
Appellee vigorously argues that the trial court determined this first issue only 
and solely as a question of law. 
That is untrue. The trial court entered both Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on this first issue. The trial court's Finding of Fact was that the decedent would 
never have executed any document designed to leave his surviving spouse destitute. 
But that is how the Contesting Children interpreted and implemented the second 
documents. Consequently, the trial court held that as a Finding of Fact the two 
documents must be read together. 
Standard for Review: 
Findings of Fact will not be reversed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338 (Utah 1999). 
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SECOND ISSUE — PHASE ONE OF THE TRIAL:1 
As to the second issue of Phase One the trial court held as a matter of law that 
the 'Trust Administration" of decedent's estates was not governed by provisions of 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
In so doing trial court erred when it construed the requirements of § 75-3-912, of 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code to not be applicable to "Trust Administration" in 
decedent's estates? Being solely an interpretation of the intent and meaning of the 
Utah Uniform Probate Code enactment by the Utah Legislature. 
Standard for Review: 
Interpretation of a Legislative Enactment is a Conclusion of Law. Savage 
Industries v. State, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). Conclusions of law are given no particular 
deference on appeal but are reviewed for correctness. See also: Carrier v. Pro-Tech, 
944 P.2d 346 (Utah 1997). 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES RAISED IN APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF: 
Although additional issues are now raised in Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief, 
all are dependent upon the trial court's resolution of the first two major issues listed 
above. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial court erroneously reasoned that the "Trust Administration" provisions 
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code had not originally been an integral part of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code. Consequently, the trial judge reasoned that § 75-3-912, 
1
 That Second Issue is listed in Appellees Brief as "Issue 3" on page tqo. 
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governing "Settlement Agreements/' was not applicable to "Trust Administration" of 
decedent's estates under judicial supervision. 
Therefore, the trial court judge found himself on the horns of a dilemma. 
• As a Finding of Fact Almon Flake would never have signed the second 
trust intending it to be interpreted as leaving his surviving spouse 
destitute, 
• But if the provisions of § 75-3-912 were not applicable to Trust 
Administration of decedent's estates the trial court must, as a matter of 
law, rule in the Contesting Children's favor, leaving Appellant destitute. 
That was the trial court's dilemma. There is no question but that § 75-3-912 
requires that every private settlement agreement related to decedent's estates must be 
set forth in a written "contract executed by all [persons] who are affected by its 
provisions." 
But if § 75-3-912 did not apply to administration of decedent's trusts and there 
was an oral agreement as claimed by the Contesting Children the law required that the 
trial court rule in favor of the Contesting Children even if the surviving spouse were left 
destitute. 
The Contesting Children adamantly claimed that in Centerville on the night of 
April 14, 1999, Marian agreed to all of their demands even though Marian has always 
denied any such claim. There was no testimony that Marian ever even verbally 
consented to the Contesting Children's demands either on April 14, 1999 or at any other 
time. 
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Marian has always forthrightly denied any such claim and refused to ever sign a 
subsequently drafted "Settlement Agreement" that had been prepared by the 
Contesting Children's legal counsel. If fact, the evidence was that nobody, not even 
one of the Contesting Children, ever signed that proposed "Settlement Agreement." 
That blank "Settlement Agreement" was admitted at trial as Defendant "Exhibit 40." 
But the trial court believed the testimony of the Contesting Children that an oral 
settlement agreement had been reached. 
Consequently, the trial court judge believed that he had no option under law but 
to rule in the Contesting Children's favor even though that oral "settlement agreement" 
left the surviving spouse destitute. 
Unfortunately, the trial judge erroneously thought himself bound and required 
by law to rule in the Contesting Children's favor. That is why the parties are now 
before this Court on appeal. This matter is before the Supreme Court because it 
involves interpretation of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
However, Appellee/Cross-Appellants' Brief has attempted to bring additional 
issues into dispute on appeal. But the Appellee/Cross-Appellants' Brief also identifies 
significant points of agreement. 
Significant Points of Agreement: 
On page four (4) of the Appellee/Cross-Appellants' Brief it states that: 
At the pretrial conference, the trial court ruled that the trial would be 
divided into several phases in order to address various issues separately, 
each of which could potentially resolve all claims in the case. [Emphasis 
added.] 
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On pages four (4) and five (5) of the Appellee/Cross-Appellants' Brief it is 
acknowledged that there were two issues before the trial court during "Phase One." 
With that the Appellant agrees. 
There were two issues before the trial court during Phase One. Both of those 
issues are identified herein above within the Statement of Issues and Standard for 
Review. The parties are in agreement that those same two issues presented to the trial 
court during Phase One. 
Two issues were presented to the trial court and ruled upon in Phase One: 
Pages five (5) and seven (7) of the Appellee/Cross-Appellants' Brief specifically 
identifies the "two issues" of Phase One: 
First Issue: 
"Phase One was to consider whether the parties reached an 
enforceable settlement agreement before the action was filed." 
(Appellees' Brief, page 5, para 2) 
Second Issue: 
"[As part of Phase One] The trial court also held that the [1999 trust] 
Restatement did not fully supercede the 1987 Trust documents?" 
(Appellees' Brief, page 7, para 1) 
Appellees' Position on Appeal: 
Appellee/Cross-Appellants' Brief now puts forth the argument on appeal that the 
trial court ruled in its favor on both issues solely as a matter of law. That is not true. 
On February 10, 2000 the trial court entered specific Findings of Fact as to the 
interrelationship between the 1987 and the 1999 trust documents. 
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Later, at the pre-trial conference the trial judge ordered that the trial be divided 
into distinct and successive Phases. The trial judge then specifically designated exactly 
what evidence would be accepted at each "Phase." 
Phase One dealt solely with the interpretation of trust documents and whether or 
not the parties had entered into an oral binding agreement after Almon's death but 
before any formal legal action had ever been commenced. During the Phase One the 
trial court only permitted evidence relating to those two specific issues. 
The reason given by the trial judge was one of judicial efficiency. Each Phase 
was so arranged that should the court rule against Marian on any one of the successive 
Phases the trial would end and judgment would be entered for the Respondents. 
No written pre-trial order was issued. However, Respondents have 
acknowledged on page four (4) of their Brief that such was the order, sequence of 
Phases and nature of proceedings before the trial court. 
Disposition Below: 
The trial court had previously entered Findings of Fact that it had entered on the 
record on February 20, 2000 that the decedent, Almon J. Flake, would never have 
intended to execute documents that would leave Marian destitute and on church 
welfare. Having entered its Findings of Fact the court then determined that both the 
1987 and the 1998 trust documents must be read together. Consequently, on the Record 
the trial judge entered both Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the 1987 and 
the 1998 trust documents must be read together. 
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It is agreed by the parties that the trial court found as a matter of law that the 
1987 and the 1998 trust documents must be read together. 
Unfortunately, the trial judge also ruled that even though no agreement was ever 
signed by any party, the trial judge found that an oral binding agreement had been 
reached against Marian's interest, thereby ending the trial at Phase One. 
Point of Agreement as to Conclusion of Trial at Phase One: 
It is agreed by all parties as stated in Appellee/Cross-Appellants' Brief 
that, 
'Those rulings [of Phase One] disposed of all of Marian's claims and the 
trial court determined there was no need to proceed to another phase of 
trial." (Appellees' Brief, page 6, paragraph 3) [Emphasis added.] 
Given the nature of the Appellees' Brief, two issues are raised on appeal: 
1. Issue raised by Appellant — Did the trial court err in holding that an oral 
binding agreement had been reached between all parties and that under provisions of 
the Utah Uniform Probate Code that oral agreement is binding against Marian's 
interest? 
2. Issue raised by Appellee — Did the trial court err in holding that the 1999 
testamentary and trust documents did not fully revoke previous documents? 
The Appellee/Cross-Appellants' Brief does mention other issues. However, all 
other issues except one may be included within the circumference of the above two. 
That one exception is Appellee/Cross-Appellants' claim that the trial judge erred 
in "failing to award attorney fees and costs resulting from Marian's failure to remove lis 
pendens from trust property." 
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In that regard, it is suspected that Appellee was not aware of a most recent Order 
of the trial court that was entered after this appeal was taken. That most recent Order 
did not become a part of the Record Index as the trial court did not file that Order until 
December 19, 2001. That Order overturned a previous trial court Stay that was issued in 
Appellee/Cross-Appellants5 favor. That most recent Order simply states that, 
Marian Flake's MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER GRANTING 
TRUSTEE'S [APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANTS'] STAY, Dated August 
29, 2001 is hereby Granted. [Emphasis in original.] 
A copy of that ORDER is in the Addendum herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. It is not mentioned in the Appellee/Cross-Appellants' Brief that February 
20, 2000 the trial court received evidence and heard the testimony of witnesses.2 
2. At the conclusion of the hearing on February 20, 2000 the trial judge 
specifically entered the following Findings: (See: Transcript of Hearing dated February 
10, 2000, pages 48-52, copies of which are included in the Addendum enclosed 
herewith.) Neither of the parties requested written findings at that time. But the trial 
court's Findings were verbal and on the Record: 
THE COURT: The Court's going to make the following findings. And 
these cases that — and I've had several — are very 
difficult for families and the parties involved, you know. 
And I didn't have an opportunity to know Mr. Flake, but it 
appears from everything that I have read that he was a 
very caring, generous, good man, you know. And in that 
regard, probably (inaudible) [disappointed] to see what's 
transpired. Because I don't think he would be a very 
happy person if he came and saw what transpired. I don't 
2
 Transcript of Hearing, February 10, 2000, Addendum. 
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think that would be his intent, in fact, in any of these 
documents to see what's happened over the last few days 
— or the last several months or almost a year. I think he 
would have resolved it somewhat differently having seen 
what has taken place and given the history of what I've 
seen and read about this man. 
The legal issue that I have to deal with is what 
document is controlling. And while I haven't reached that 
determination, I think that there is a substantial question as 
to whether the first trust, the second trust, if there is a 
trust, and what document controls. There is [are] different 
languages, which we [he] initially provided. 
Initially, he provided for the care — required the trust 
to care for the needs, including her living arrangements in 
the home or other reasonable living quarters. 
[In] the second trust there was no mention that the 
trust shall care for the needs but it limited the payment of 
the second trust of how the home should be handled, and 
required that it be placed in a second trust, and that while 
it's in the second trust, that the trust shall pay for only 
certain costs and that other costs allowed the trustee to 
pay for such maintenance costs that the trustee should feel 
what is appropriate. 
For purposes of temporary support, I'm trying to 
determine, then, what are her reasonable needs. And I 
think that's more than minimum needs. I think it's what are 
her reasonable needs. I think it should exclude things that 
are not reasonable because of how this may end. 
So the Court is going to make the following 
determination: As to the medical expenses, that there's no 
question she has substantial medical needs, including 
issues with hearing aids, dental work, and medical. So I'm 
going to attribute $575 a month to her medical needs. And 
that includes certain testimony that I received in chambers 
as to her dental needs and bills that were presented to the 
Court as to what it's going to take to do her dental needs, 
plus her hearing aids. 
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Insurance, the Court is going to attribute $156, $146 to 
Blue Cross, plus $10 co-pay. Her car, $200, at $70 
insurance. I think there is gas and upkeep. And I think 
that at least she has had to make transportation for 
treatment, going to the hospital, and so it would 
necessitate regular use of the automobile. 
The phone, a reasonable use, the Court's going to 
attribute $100. For food, $300. Her home maintenance will 
be taken care of. The Court's going to reduce that from 
$500 to $75. Recreation, from $150 to $75. I don't think 
there was shown recreation in terms of $150. Clothes and 
personal items, I think she does have some personal needs. 
The Court's going to reduce that from 300 to $100. 
The miscellaneous, I think there are certain 
miscellaneous items, although during this time the trust is 
probably not responsible for gifts and those things, and 
the Court is going to reduce that to $100. 
Also, the Court is going to allow tithing as a reasonable 
expense, because I think when there are (inaudible) Mr. 
Flake through his life has paid that, I'm going to make that 
determination and is going to do that. 
Those items added together would be $1,772.30. If I 
take the $913, that leaves a balance of $859.30. The Court 
— I believe that there has been, because of the pendency 
and the time, that there has been some back (inaudible). So 
the Court is going to — feels that there are some expenses 
that have accrued, because she's had to charge items and 
hasn't had funds available. So the Court is going to order 
that the trust pay her living expenses, plus $1,000 on a 
temporary basis until there's a final resolution and 
interpretation of that agreement. [Emphasis added.] 
3. Concluding that the law required that he rule against Marian as a matter of 
law at trial, the trial court still held that the Contesting Children must continue to pay 
Marian additional support in the amount of $350.45 per month. The trial court 
determined that that such amount was in accordance with what the trial court had 
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determined was within the meaning of what was intended by the unsigned "settlement 
agreement."3 
4. Two different versions of that draft "settlement agreement" that had been 
prepared by the Contesting Children's attorney are included within the Addendum 
herein. The two versions were admitted in evidence at trial as Plaintiff "Exhibit 2", 
Defendant "Exhibit 38" and as Defendant "Exhibit 40." The first transmission of that 
proposed "settlement agreement" to Marian was by letter from the Contesting 
Children's attorney dated April 29, 1999. The first version included blank lines for both 
signatures and Notary. The second version, transmitted by letter from the Contesting 
Children's attorney dated October 1, 19994 had deleted the space for signature or 
Notary. Even the first letter from the Contesting Children's attorney dated April 29, 
1999 (enclosed herein as part of the Addendum) stated that: 
I have enclosed a draft of the agreement made by the parties on April 14. 
Please review the agreement with your client [Marian] and then let me 
know if there are any clarifications or modifications that you feel would be 
appropriate. [Emphasis added.] 
5. Some time subsequent to trial the Respondents obtained a Stay that they 
not be required to pay anything to Marian. However, on December 19, 2001 an Order of 
the trial court was entered that granted "Marian Flake's Motion for Relief from Order 
Granting Trustee's Stay, Dated August 29, 2001." A copy of that Order is included in 
the Addendum. 
3
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, July 11, 2001, page 20, subparagraph "d", Record at 
page 1161. 
4
 Plaintiffs "Exhibit 2". 
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6. Yet, it is a fact that there is no evidence that Marian has received any 
funds from for her support from November 15, 1998 to the present except for the 
temporary support. Even though, arguably the estate of Almon J. Flake may have 
exceeded $800,000.005, Marian only received the temporary support for a period of eight 
(8) months, being from February 2000 to September 2000. Almon has been dead now for 
more than three years. In justification, the Contesting children have stated through the 
trustee, their brother, neither they, the estate nor the trust have any obligation for 
Marian's support, "no obligation" to provide any funds of any kind for Marian's 
support.6 
7. When their brother, Joel, testified at trial the Contesting Children took the 
position they had no obligation "of any kind" to Marian even if she were literally 
starving to death.7 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At a hearing on February 10, 2000 trial judge had entered Findings of Fact on the 
record that Almon Flake would not have ever intend to leave his surviving spouse, 
Marian, destitute and on welfare because of his death. Decedent's estate arguably 
exceeded $800,000.00 just days before his death. 
However, the trial judge believed himself bound by the law as argued by 
opposing legal counsel at trial and his conclusion expressed from the bench that the 
Trust provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code just were not part of the original 
5
 Record, Transcript of Proceedings, February 10, 2000, page 2, line 1. 
6
 Record, Trial Transcript, pages 145-147. See also Appellant's Brief page 11. 
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legislative enactment. The judge commented that he had previously worked in the 
Office of Legislative Counsel and knew how such errors could happen. Consequently, 
the trial judge believed himself bound by law to rule in the Contesting Children's favor, 
leaving Marian destitute. The trial judge was in error as to the intent, purpose and 
meaning of the provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code and the public policy 
surrounding that enactment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
The trial Transcript reflects that the trial judge struggled with what he understood to be 
his obligation under law to enforce all settlement agreements. 
As cited and quoted in the original Appellant Brief, the trial judge believed 
himself bound by the 1993 Court of Appeals case of Goodmanson v. Liberty Bending, 
866 P.2d 581, 866 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The impact and implications of the trial judge's conclusions as to his obligations 
under both Goodmanson and the Utah Uniform Probate Code must be appreciated. 
Judge Memmott's comments in the Transcript seemed almost agonizing, especially in 
light of his Findings that he made at the evidentiary Hearing on February 10, 2000. 
In explaining how he felt bound law to rule against Marian's interest he 
commenced by reference to the holding of the Court of Appeals in Goodmanson. Judge 
o 
Memmott commented: 
Now, normally, as set forth in Goodmanson vs. Liberty Bending at 866 
P.2d 581, there is a summary of the standard of review of a trial court and 
7
 See Appellant Brief, page 11, quoting Trial Transcript, pages 145-147. 
8
 Record, Trial Transcript, September 27-29, pages 289-292. 
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the ability of a trial court to enforce a settlement agreement and that it's 
not to be reversed except upon the finding of abuse of discretion and it 
goes through a litany of cases and explains that a court should enforce 
settlement agreements in lawsuits and it doesn't make any difference 
when that settlement agreement, whether it takes place out of presence of 
the court. It is the duty of the court to enforce settlement agreements and 
it specifically says in that case, it's of no legal consequence if the parties 
have not signed the settlement agreement. Likewise, if a written 
agreement is intended to memorialize an oral contract, the subsequent 
failure to execute the written document does not nullify the oral contract. 
However, Goodmanson is distinguishable from the present case because there 
never was any signed agreement. In Goodmanson counsel for both parties had signed a 
written agreement. In the present case there was no evidence that there was ever any 
written document upon which the parties ever agreed. 
POINT 2 
The verbal Findings of Fact of the trial court given on the Record of Hearing dated 
February 10, 2000 are valid and are not inconsistent with final Conclusions of Law under 
which the trial judge believed himself to be bound. 
This Supreme Court has previously held that it is not required that oral Findings 
of Fact must be reduced to writing to be valid. In the case of Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 
P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1979) this Court held that: 
Generally, where no request has been made for findings of fact, the 
presumption is that the trial court found all facts necessary to support its 
order and judgment. 
That same conclusion was affirmed and followed by the Utah Supreme Court in 
the case of Utah v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,787 (Utah 1991): 
This court has held that in cases in which factual issues are presented 
to and must be resolved by the trial court but no findings of fact appear in 
the record, we "assume that the trier of facts found them in accord with its 
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decision, and we affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be 
reasonable to find facts to support it." n6 
n6 [*788] Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 6, 245 P.2d 224, 
226 (1952); see also Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 P.2d 1346, 1348 
(Utah 1979); Mojave Uranium Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 22 
Utah 2d 239, 244 n.7, 451 P.2d 587, 591 n.7 (1969). If the 
ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption unreasonable, 
however, we remand for a new trial. See Darger v. Nielsen, 605 
P.2d 1223, 1225 n.2 (Utah 1979); Christensen v. Abbott, 595 P.2d 
900, 903 (Utah 1979); Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 
538 P.2d 301, 305 (Utah 1975); Thomas v. Farrell, 82 Utah 535, 
542-43, 26 P.2d 328, 330-31 (1933). As the court of appeals 
recently noted in reviewing a search and seizure decision, "The 
issues presented in search and seizure cases are highly fact 
sensitive. ... Thus, detailed findings are necessary to enable this 
court to meaningfully review the issues on appeal." State v. 
Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) [**44] 
(citations omitted). 
This court in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987), 
stated, "Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material 
issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are 'clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment.'" Id. at 999 (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). The court of appeals apparently 
relied on this statement of the standard in its recent decision in 
State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 152 Utah Adv. Rep. 19, 26 n.26 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Acton's precise wording of the standard, 
however, is not entirely accurate. It is true that Kinkella v. 
Baugh, upon which the Action court relied, did find the trial 
court's failure to make findings harmless because the facts in the 
record were "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment." Kinkella, 660 P.2d at 
236. However, Kinkella did not say that in all other 
circumstances, a failure to make findings on all material issues is 
reversible error. Rather, it is only one ground for avoiding 
reversal for not making such findings. In finding the error 
harmless, the Kinkella court cited Corpus Juris Secundum, 
which lists the "clear and uncontroverted" standard as only one 
of several ways to avoid reversing a trial court that fails to make 
findings. See 5B C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1790 (1958). 
Furthermore, this court has recognized many of the other ways 
C.J.S. lists as ways to avoid reversing such a trial court. See, 
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e.g., Sorenson v. Beers, 614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 1980) (trial court 
upheld where requisite factual findings that were not made 
would only make explicit what was already implicit in other 
findings); Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1979) 
(presumption that trial court found facts necessary to support 
judgment); Farrell v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 351, 355, 482 P.2d 117, 
119 (1971) (even without requisite findings, trial court will be 
upheld if there is competent evidence to support ruling); 
Mojave Uranium Co. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 22 Utah 2d 239, 244 
n.7, 451 P.2d 587, 591 n.7 (1969) (presumption that findings, if 
made, would be in harmony with decision); Mower v. McCarthy, 
122 Utah 1,6,245 P.2d 224,226 (1952) (absent findings we affirm 
if it would be reasonable to find facts to support conclusion). 
In summary, the general rule is best and most inclusively 
stated as it was set forth in Mower: this court upholds the trial 
court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it 
would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made 
such findings. [Emphasis added] 
On February 10, 2000 the trial court granted temporary support by entering a 
Finding of Fact that Almon J. Flake was not the kind of man who would have 
intentionally left Marian destitute upon his death. 
From the date Almon died there is no evidence that the Contesting Children ever 
voluntarily permitted Marian to have one dime or gave her anything to sustain herself. 
Even though the trial court felt bound by law to rule against Marian an order 
"consistent with the settlement agreement" was entered that the Contesting Children 
provide Marian $350.45 per month, nothing has been forthcoming. The actions of the 
Contesting Children in claiming their father wished to leave Marian destitute are, to say 
the least, disingenuous and exceptionally self-serving. In holding that position the 
Contesting Children have taken a posture of destitution for Marian, choosing instead to 
substantially benefit only themselves. 
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POINT 3 
Espousing a position of leaving a surviving widow destitute is a violation of 
public policy set forth by the Utah Legislature through enactment of the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code. The Uniform Probate Code specifically encompassed administration of 
decedent's trusts within that policy. 
In support of their position the Appellee/Cross-Appellants' Brief inappropriately 
cites two cases. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), and Estate of Grimm v. 
Roberts, 784 P.2d 1238 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The Pena case is easily distinguishable. State v. Pena is a criminal case. 
Citing Pena, attempting to circumvent the provisions of the Utah Probate Law, 
the Cross-Appellants argue dicta, claiming that the Pena case constitutes precedent 
that the trial court in the present matter properly held that an oral settlement agreement 
on matters of decedent's estates constitutes a waiver of all of rights. But the dicta of 
the Pena case doesn't even support that position. 
In the present case there is no evidence that Marian ever agreed to anything. 
There is no evidence that Marian consented to anything. Nothing was ever concluded 
or signed. 
Cross-Appellants also cite and quote Estate of Grimm v. Roberts as if that 
decision of the Court of Appeals was in their favor. It was not. 
The facts in Grimm v. Roberts, at 1240, were that "after extensive and 
continuous negotiations" a written agreement was "executed" by the parties. 
In Grimm there had been a written and signed "Family Settlement Agreement" 
("FMA"). In addition the Grimm trial court also had entered three findings as to that 
agreement, 
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By its judgment, the court ruled (1) the FAS was a valid and binding 
agreement; (2) that it was just and reasonable and, to the extent approval 
of the court was necesssary, it was approved by the court; (3) the estate 
was to be distributed in accordance with the FSA. 
The Grimm case even goes further in than that in Marian's favor. Grimm dealt 
with interpretation and law that governed the decedent's Trust. Following the 
provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code the Grimm case included Trust 
Administration within and under all provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code and 
the public policy expressed therein. Grimm cited Part 11, of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code, titled "Compromise of Controversies," specifically §75-3-1101, et seq., that is 
titled, "Effect of Approval of Agreements Involving Trusts." 
The expressed purpose of the Contesting Children has been to cut Marian off 
completely. Completing their design the Contesting Children left Marian without any 
support, arguably taking to themselves more than $800,000.00 in the process. 
Immediately upon Almon's death the Contesting Children took over, instantly 
leaving Marian alone, impoverished and receiving welfare from her church. Then, many 
months later, on April 14, 1999, the Contesting Children came to the home and 
presented Marian with their demands. 
They say that Marian "agreed" to her impoverishment and "waived" all objection 
to the contrary. But there is no evidence that Marian ever agreed to any such thing. 
The best claim the Contesting Children have against Marian is that she remained silent. 
Any agreement from a meeting between the parties on April 14, 1999 could only be 
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inferred. Even the letter sent weeks later from the Contesting Children's attorney, dated 
April 28, 1999 stated that "enclosed [is] a draft of the agreement." 
This present case constitutes an open and uncompromising attempt to 
circumvent Utah Law and public policy. A current trend has made the word "trust" 
very marketable in estate planning of all kinds. 
A trust "may" result in avoidance of probate of a decedent's estate but it may 
not be used as a means of avoiding several hundred years in the development of a 
civilized society leaning how to protect the poor and disadvantaged. 
The very strong policy as to estates of decedents, expressed through the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code, does not permit any person to give away assets, resulting in the 
surviving spouse being left impoverished and on welfare. 
It is recognized that many people now use trusts. That is a popular thing to do. 
That is why the Uniform Probate Code encompasses administration of all decedent 
estates, including "certain" trusts. 
Why "certain" trusts? 
Because inter-vivos trusts are now more widely used and sold as a means to less 
formal handling of decedent's estates. Because the word "trust" is so marketable and 
widely used that word now required six (6) pages for definition in Black's Law 
Dictionary, 6th Ed., 1991. 
Some years ago counsel participated in a seminar at which one of the presenters 
said, "If you have a client who wants to trash his wife when he dies just remember that 
it can be done with a Trust in [a named East-coast state]. The presenter then 
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commented, 'That might not be a nice thing to do but if that is what your client wants 
you need to know that it's possible — how and where." 
There may be various states with various laws but such a thing certainly is not 
the law of the State of Utah and is not included in the common-law states. And any 
plan to "trash" a surviving spouse certainly is not intended in any of the community-
property states. 
Yet, that is exactly what the Contesting Children are trying to make out of the 
laws of the State of Utah. Some uncertainty as to the meaning of the word "trust" gives 
an opportunity for the Appellee/Cross-Appellants to circumvent and negate Utah Laws 
related to administration of decedents' estates. Appellee/Cross-Appellants have 
espoused their position before the trial court and now on appeal. Their position is that 
the provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code do not apply to trusts or any transfers 
made to themselves immediately before their father's death. 
Appellee/Cross-Appellants attempted to use a "trust" to eliminate decedent laws 
that have been developed over a hundred years of social relations in this State. Utah 
law provides for protection of a surviving spouse, the widow, the poor and the 
disadvantaged. 
Appellee/Cross-Appellants wish now to persuade this Court ignore that Utah 
Law governing decedents' estates includes not only "Trusts" but Elective Share and a 
number of options designed to protect the dependent spouse, children and the elderly. 
Ignoring the disadvantaged is not the law or the moral basis upon which the law rests in 
this State. 
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Quoting from the Editorial Board Comments published with the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code, Part 2, titled "Elective Share of Surviving Spouse," 
The sections of this part describe a system for common-law states 
designed to protect a spouse of a decedent who was a domiciliary against 
donative transfers by will and will substitutes which would deprive the 
survivor of a "fair share" of the decedent's estate. 
* * * 
Some have questioned the need for any legislation checking the power 
of married persons to transfer their property as they please. ... Still, all 
common-law states except the Dakotas appear to impose some restriction 
on the power of a spouse to disinherit the other. ... In most states, 
including many which have abolished dower [i.e. Utah], a spouse's 
protection is found in statutes which give a surviving spouse the power 
to take a share of the decedent's probate estate upon election rejecting 
the provisions of the decedent's will. These [state] statutes expand the 
spouse's protection to all real and personal assets owned by the decedent 
at death, but usually take no account of various will substitutes which 
permit an owner to transfer ownership at his death without use of a will. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The Uniform Probate Code, the Utah Legislature's enactment of the provision of 
that Uniform Code and this State's prior laws have firmly established the rights of a 
surviving spouse. 
Section 75-l-102(2)(d) of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, titled "Purposes, Rule 
of Construction," contains provisions that include "certain trusts." In other words, the 
provisions and purposes of the Utah Uniform Probate Code establish law and public 
policy governing distribution of decedent's estates, including common trust documents 
that are widely used to transfer decedent's estates today. 
That is why this matter is before this Court on appeal today. This matter is 
before this Court today because the trial court held that the surviving spouse 
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provisions and protections within the Utah Uniform Probate Code do not apply to 
trusts. That is reversible error. 
Marian has critical needs. At the Evidentiary Hearing on February 10, 2000, the 
trial court awarded Marian a minimum temporary required support of an additional 
$1,000.00 from the decedent's estate to meet her minimum needs pending final trial and 
determination of all issues. 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code must be read as a whole. It must not be 
permitted to be taken apart by the self-serving to circumvent the clear intent and 
purpose of laws of this State designed to protect persons who are left with no means to 
protect themselves. 
Even if Almon J. Flake was the kind of man who wanted to trash his surviving 
spouse, which the trial court found that he was not, Utah Law does not permit that 
amoral kind of action by the decedent or his or her surviving children. 
CONCLUSION 
As required under § 75-3-912, any agreement between private parties dealing 
with distribution of decedent estates must be set forth in a "written contract executed 
by all who are affected by its provisions." 
There is no legal merit to the Appellee/Cross-Appellants' position otherwise. 
Therefore, Appellant prays that decision of the trial court be reversed, the matter 
remanded, directing the relief prayed for in the Appellant Brief, that this Court consider 




DATED: this _0_ day of February 1999. 
I /Lo / en D. Martin / 
^ Counsel for Appellant 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ALMON J. FLAKE, 
Deceased. 
MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA 
& MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
Probate No: 993700264 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
Comes now Connie Flake Jackson, pro se, and hereby moves this court to quash 
and for a Protective Order as it pertains to Petitioner Marion Flake's subpoena upon Connie 
Flake Jackson. The Petitioner has intentionally violated, disregarded, or otherwise failed to 
comply with Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Particularly, no fee was attached 
with said subpoenas. 
DATED this _18^_ day of February, 2000. 
CONNIE FLAKE JACKSON, pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION 
TO QUASH SUBPOENA & MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER, via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Loren D. Martin D. Bruce Oliver 
MARTIN & NELSON D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C. 
P.O. Box 11590 180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dated this 18th day of February, 2000. 
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A l t -f' 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Respondent Joel Flake 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
In the Matter of the Estate of: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTIONS RE: SUBPOENAS 
ALMON J. FLAKE, 
Deceased. 
Probate No: 993700264 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
) 
Comes now Respondent, Joel Flake, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, 
and hereby submits this memorandum in support of his Motion to Quash and Motion for 
Protective Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Previously, the Petitioner had served subpoenas upon multiple parties without 
copies being provided to Respondent's counsel as required by Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure including the Respondent Joel Flake's counsel, D. Bruce Oliver. Since that 
date, Petitioner has apparently re-served all the same parties with new subpoenas. All of the 
parties have sought to quash said subpoenas, including this Respondent due to substantial 
violations of Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(%jjLd&Hc(&#l 
In this matter, the Petitioner has not provided any of the served witnesses with 
witness fees, or make arrangements for copy expenses. Moreover, it appears that said 
subpoenas were served by a party to the action. The Petitioner's counsel had each of the 
subpoenas served by an employee of Martin & Nelson, P.C. (The Petitioner's attorneys). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SUBPOENA SHOULD BE QUASHED AND RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED 
TO A PROTECTIVE ORDER. 
Contrary to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, under the power or 
abuse of the subpoena, the Petitioner can complete delivery of voluminous documents in the 
Respondent's possession, whether relevant or not to the matter at hand. Rule 34, the usual 
means of production of documents, the Respondent may merely make said records available for 
inspection and copying by Petitioner's counsel. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 21-5-4 (1953, as amended) requires the Petitioner to 
bear the expenses of a witness, including fees and mileage. Additionally, Section 21-5-8 
identifies that fees and compensation in all civil causes shall be paid by the party who causes 
the witnesses to attend. In this matter, the Petitioner has caused all of the parties to attend and 
delivery documents, many of which would be redundantly delivered due to their the subpoenas 
broadly general language and service upon multiple parties. 
Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure limits who may effect service on 
an individual. The subsection reads, "[Pleadings] may be served in this state or any other state 
or territory of the United States, by the sheriff or constable, or by the deputy of either, by a 
United States Marshall or by the marshall's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or 
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older at the time of service, and not a party to the action or a party's attorney."1 
In this matter, the Petitioner's attorney had all the individuals served, served by 
"Emily Jayne Kunz" and agent and employee of the Petitioner's attorneys firm. Such service 
is impermissible under the rules as Ms. Kunz is an agent of the firm Martin and Nelson, P.C. 
(The Petitioner's attorneys). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, D. Bruce Oliver, counsel of record, hereby requests 
a motion to quash the subpoena and for a Protective Order. Counsel should not have to testify 
nor produce documents protected under the attorney client privilege and the work product 
doctrine. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2000. 
sd? 4L. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Respondent Joel Flake 
1
 Substitution of "pleading" for the words "The summons and complaint" is permitted by 
Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by reference. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS RE: SUBPOENAS, via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to: Loren D. Martin, MARTIN & NELSON, P.O. Box 11590, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
Dated this #$? day of February, 2000. 
7 v ^ ^ 
Lynette Flake Watts, pro se 
984 North 500 East 
Centerville, Utah 84014 
Telephone: (801) 295-8071 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ALMON J. FLAKE, 
Deceased. 
MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA 
& MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
Probate No: 993700264 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
Comes now Lynette Flake Watts, pro se, and hereby moves this court to quash 
and for a Protective Order as it pertains to Petitioner Marion Flake's subpoena upon Lynette 
Flake Watts. The Petitioner has intentionally violated, disregarded, or otherwise failed to 
comply with Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Particularly, no fee was attached 
with said subpoenas. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2000. 
^L. t^hk^lufCtfe^ 
LYNETTE FLAKE" WATTS,"pro se 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION 
TO QUASH SUBPOENA & MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER, via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Loren D. Martin D. Bruce Oliver 
MARTIN & NELSON D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C. 
P.O. Box 11590 180 South 300 West. Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 




Mark Widdison Flake, pro se 
943 West 150 South 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Telephone: (801) 544-7615 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
In the Matter of the Estate of: 
ALMON J. FLAKE, 
Deceased. 
) 
MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENA 
& MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER 
Probate No: 993700264 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
Comes now Mark Widdison Flake, pro se, and hereby moves this court to quash 
and for a Protective Order as it pertains to Petitioner Marion Flake's subpoena upon Mark 
Widdison Flake. The Petitioner has intentionally violated, disregarded, or otherwise failed to 
comply with Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Particularly, no fee was attached 
with said subpoenas. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2000. 
<-SO 
MARK WIDDISON FLAKE, pro se 
COOfeusk* 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION 
TO QUASH SUBPOENA & MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER, via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Loren D. Martin D. Bruce Oliver 
MARTIN & NELSON D. BRUCE OLIVER, P.C. 
P.O. Box 11590 180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dated this 18th day of February, 2000. 
<ZJ&*ts&«>i 
l F\ 
MARTIN & NELSON, PC 
Loren D. Martin (2101) 
139 East on South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-0066; Facsimile: (801) 538-0073 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
800 W. State Street, PO Box 769, Farmington, Utah 84025 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
ALMON J. FLAKE, 
Deceased. 
ORDER 
Re: Granting Marian Flake's Motion 
Case No. 99-370-0264 
Judge: Jon M. Memmott 
This matter came before the Court on Notice to Submit for Decision on October o ^ , 
2001. The Court, being fully advised in the matter and good cause appearing therefore, Marian 
Flake's MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM ORDER GRANTING TRUSTEE'S STAY, Dated 
August 29, 2001 is hereby Granted. 
DATED: October 3 3 . 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
JON H. MEMMOTT 
District Judge 
SI V/Zet^j/t*** 
Hearing Re: Aimon J. Flake 02/10/00 
Page 48 
1 $913. And so the difference between the 913 and the 1200 is 
2 (inaudible). 
3 THE COURT: The Court's going to make the following 
4 findings. And these cases that -- and Ifve had several --
5 are very difficult for families and the parties involved, you 
6 know. And I didn't have an opportunity to know Mr. Flake, 
7 but it appeared from everything that I have read, that he was 
8 a very caring, generous, good man, you know. And in that 
9 regard, probably (inaudible) to see what's transpired. 
10 Because I don't think he would be a very happy person if he 
11 came and saw what transpired. I don't think that would be 
12 his intent, in fact, in any of these documents to see what's 
13 happened over the last few days — or the last several months 
14 or almost a year. I think he would have resolved it somewhat 
15 differently having seen what has taken place and given the 
16 history of what I've seen and read about this man. 
17 The legal issues that I have to deal with is what 
18 document is controlling. And while I haven't reached that 
19 determination, I think that there is a substantial question 
20 as to whether the first trust, the second trust, if there is 
21 a trust, and what document controls. There is different 
22 languages, which we initially provided. 
23 Initially, he provided for the care -- required the 
24 trust to care for the needs, including her living 
25 arrangements in the home or other reasonable living quarters. 
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The second trust there was no mention that the 
trust shall care 
the second trust 
required that it 
for the needs, but it limited the payment of < 
of how the home should be handled, and 
be placed in a second trust, and that while 
it's in the second trust, that the trust shall pay for only 
certain costs and that other costs allowed the trustee to pay 
for such maintenance costs that the trustee should feel what 
is appropriate. 
For purposes of temporary support, Ifm trying to 
determine, then, 
that's more than 
reasonable needs 
what are her reasonable needs. And I think 
minimum needs. I think it's what are her 
I think it should exclude things that are 
not reasonable because of how this may end. 
So the Court is going to make the following 
determination: As to the medical expenses, that there's no 
question she has substantial medical needs, including issues 
with hearing aids, dental work, and medical. So Ifm going to 
! attribute $575 a 
includes certain 
! her dental needs 
month to her medical needs. And that 
testimony that I received in chambers as to 
and bills that were presented to the Court 
\ as to what it's going to take to do her dental needs, plus 
her hearing aids 
Insurance, the Court is going to attribute $156. 
$146 to Blue Cross, plus $10 co-pay. Her car, $200, at $70 
insurance. I think there is gas and upkeep. And I think 
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that at least she has had to make transportation for 
treatment, going to the hospital, and so it would necessitate 
regular use of the automobile. 
The phone, a reasonable use, the Court 's going to 
attribute $100. For food, $300. Her home maintenance will 
be taken care of. The Court's going to reduce that from $500 
to $75. Recreation, from $150 to $75. I don't think there 
was shown recreation in terms of $150. Clothes and personal 
items, I think she does have some personal needs. The 
Court's going to reduce that from 300 to $100. 
The miscellaneous, I think there are certain 
miscellaneous items, although during this time the trust is 
probably not responsible for gifts and those things, and the 
Court is going to reduce that to $100. 
Also, the Court is going to allow tithing as a 
reasonable expense, because I think when there are 
(inaudible) Mr. Flake through his life has paid that, I'm 
going to make that determination and is going to do that. 
Those items added together would be $1,772.30. If 
I take the $913, that leaves a balance of $859.30. The 
Court -- I believe that there has been, because of the 
pendency and the time, that there has been some back 
(inaudible). So the Court is going to -- feels that there 
are some expenses that have accrued, because she's had to 
charge items and hasn't had funds available. So the Court is 
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1 going to order that the trust pay her living expenses, plus 
2 $1,000 on a temporary basis until there's a final resolution 
3 and interpretation of that agreement. 
4 Are there any questions about — 
5 MR. MARTIN: Just a question, Your Honor. We have 
6 a difference of 859.30, which was calculated as reasonable 
7 living expenses, another $1,000 per month as to the back — 
8 the costs that have been accrued, is that what you mean? 
9 THE COURT: No, the $1,000 a month — beginning in 
10 the month of February, the trust will pay $1,000, plus the 
11 cost of the home, including the (inaudible). I'm not going 
12 to make it retroactive. I think she's incurred some 
13 expenses. There's some expenses she hasn't had, but there's 
14 some she's had to charge and everything else because she 
15 hasn't had adequate funds. So that's why the Court is — 
16 there's approximately $140 a month difference that the Court 
17 is awarding between what I have as reasonable necessary 
18 expenses and what I'm awarding. 
19 MR. MARTIN: The final order, then, is that we have 
20 $1,000 a month the trust will pay to her — 
21 THE COURT: Yes. 
22 MR. MARTIN: — beginning in February? 
23 THE COURT: Beginning in February, yes. It will be 
24 paid by the end of February and the last day of each month. 
25 And that is just on a temporary basis. This is not a 
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permanent award. And I would be glad as soon as the parties 
want to schedule this, so there can be a final disposition. 
In a final disposition, all of this could change. This is 
just a temporary award. And so I would be glad to schedule 
as soon as the parties are ready to have a full hearing or 
trial in this matter. 
MR. OLIVER: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. MARTIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Martin, you'll prepare the order? 
MR. MARTIN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Thereupon, the hearing was concluded.) 
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Utah's Leader in Litigation Support 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 905, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801-985-3180 Toll Free: 877-441-8180 Fax:801-985-8181 
(%^C6£0t6&+*" 
^ w / i / e f \^s VWKOLy 0 * * . 0 < ^ . V ^ . . 
Salt Lake City Office Attorneys and Counselors at Law Kaysville Office 
Westgate Business Center DA VID RA Y CARVER Corners Professional Bldg. 
SO South 300 West, Suite 2 IS ORSON B. WEST 93 South Main, Suite 2 
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Telephone: (801) 364-3130 Telephone: (801) 547-9262 
April 28, 1999 
Mr. David J. Crapo 
Wood Crapo L.L.C. 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: The Almon J. Flake Family Trust 
Your client: Marian R. Flake 
Dear Mr. Crapo: 
I have enclosed a draft of the agreement made by the parties on April 14. Please review 
the agreement with your client and then let me know if there are any clarifications or 
modifications that you feel would be appropriate. 
The Trustee has made the following payments, per the agreement made April 14: 
Davis Schools Credit Union S1,981.97 balance paid 4-15-99 
ZCMI $ 1,272.96 balance paid 4-16-99 
Mervyn's $ 324.37 valance paid 4-16-99 
The Target account, in the amount of $682.31, will be paid as soon as you notify me what the 
account number is. Target would not release any information to the Trustee. 
CUNA Mutual released the following information to the Trustee: 
Policy No. 000425975 (monthly premium of $72.54) was surrendered for the cash 
value by Marian in November, 1998. I am very disappointed in her 
representations regarding this policy. 
Policy No. JV3013314 ($10,000 face amount, $67.54 monthly premium) is 
current. CUNA is sending the ownership change papers to Marian. Please have 
her transfer ownership to the trust as soon as possible. 
The Forethought Burial Plan is in the process of changing the ownership to the trust. 
Wood Crapo L.L.C. 
April 28, 1999 
Page 2 
Please let me know the Target account number as soon as possible. Also, please let me 
know what progress has been made regarding the NuSkin stock or what information you have 
obtained. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
David Ray Carver 




The following parties agree to this settlement agreement as resoTvingjdLof the below 
issues and all claims that Marian R. Flake may have against the estate of Almon J. Flake or The 
Almon J. Flake Family Trust dated September 22, 1987 (hereinafter the "Trust"). 
1. Marian R. Flake is the surviving spouse of Almon J. Flake. She resides at 604 East 540 
North, Centerville, Utah 84014. 
2. Joel A. Flake is the current Trustee of The Almon J. Flake Family Trust. All information 
concerning the Trust should be sent to him at 1913 West 500 North, Provo, Utah 84601. 
3. On April 14, 1999, Marian R. Flake and her attorney, David J. Crapo, meet with Joel A. 
Flake (the Trustee) and David Ray Carver (the attorney for the Trustee) along with three 
of the other children of Almon J. Flake. The only child not present was Vicki Lynn 
Flake. 
4. The Trust has already distributed the Cadillac to Marian R. Flake pursuant to Article DC 
paragraph C of the Trust. 
5. The Trust shall manage the home as provided in Article IX paragraph D of the Trust 
wherein it states the following: 
D. Marian R. Flake. If Marian R. Flake survives me, the main part of my home 
(located at 604 East 540 North in Centerville) shall be held in a separate trust as a life 
estate for her benefit. The Trust shall pay the following costs associated with the 
property: property insurance, property taxes, electricity, heating fuel, water, and other 
city utilities. Marian R. Flake shall pay all other costs associated with the property 
including telephone charges and maintenance and upkeep costs. However, the Trustee 
shall have discretion to pay such part or all of the maintenance costs of the home that the 
Trustee feels is appropriate. 
1. The Trustee may rent out the basement apartment to generate funds to 
take care of the costs of the home. The Trustee may also use such other funds in 
the Trust as may be necessary to take care of the costs of the home. 
2. This life estate will terminate at the earlier of the death of Marian R. 
Flake, her moving from the home, her remarriage or cohabitation, or her prior 
failure to pay her share of the costs associated with the property. 
3. At the termination of this life estate this trust shall be distributed as 
provided in paragraph E below. 
6. The Trust agreed to pay the following debts in the approximate amount as follows: 
Davis Schools Credit Union $2,100.00 ($1,981.97 balance paid 4-15-99) 
ZCMI $ 1,371.23 ($1.272.96 balance paid 4-16-99) 
Mervyn's $ 168.49 ($324.37 balance paid 4-16-99) 
Target S 682.31 To be paid when Marion informs Trustee of 
account number. 
7. Marian R. Flake agreed to immediately close all of the accounts listed in paragraph 6 
8. Marian R. Flake will file a joint tax return for the tax years 1998 andv|999. Any savings 
resulting by filing the joint tax return will be retained by the Trust. 
9. Marian R. Flake will assign ownership of the funeral plan to the Trust. The Trust will 
maintain a funeral plan to take care of her reasonable funeral expenses. 
10. Marian R. Flake will assign to the Trust ownership of CUNAsMutual Life InsurancW 
Policy No. JV3013314. The Trust may pay the premiums and receive the proceeds tV~ 
reimburse the trust for some of the expenses the Trust paid on her behalf. 
(11 . The electricity to the barn shall be disconnected. Marian R. Flake may keep storage items 
in the upper part of the barn but she does so at her own risk due to the condition of the 
barn. The Trust may keep items in the bottom part of the barn at its own risk. 
12.^ In an effort to avoid needless confusion after the death of Marian R. Flake, she will make 
a list of personal property items that will disclose who she feels owns the listed personal 
property items. The Trustee (representing the children of Almon J. Flake) will have the 
opportunity to make any additions to the list and to state any reason that they believe the 
ownership of the item should be different that as stated. The list of personal property 
items will disclose the following: 
(1) her separate property, 
(2) the separate property of Almon J. Flake, and 
(3) the joint property of Marian R. Flake and Almon J. Flake (which will be divided 
equally by their two families after Marian dies). 
13/ If Marian R. Flake discovers any additional records of Almon J. Flake she shall release 
the records to the Trustee. 
14 In consideration for the above payments made by the Trust, Marian R. Flake hereby 
releases any other claim she may have been able to make against the estate of Almon J. 
Flake or The Almon J. Flake Family Trust dated September 22, 1987 including any rights 
that she might have had under the provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
DATED this day of May 1999. 
\s 
Marian R. Flake Joel A. Flake, Trustee 
0L _ J^y 
State of ) 
:ss. 
County of ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this day of May 1999 by 
Marian R. Flake. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
State of ) 
:ss. 
County of ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this day of May 1999 by 
Joel A. Flake, Trustee. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
3 
Salt Lake City Office 
Westgate Business Center 
180 South 300 West, Suite 218 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
Telephone- (801) 364-3130 
awe* &" 
Attorneys and Counselors at Law 
DAVID RAY CARVER 
ORSON B WEST 
<-c* 
Kavsville Office 
Corners Professional Bldg 
93 South Main. Suite 2 
Kaysville. Utah $403~ 
Telephone fSOl) jJ~-9262 
October 1, 1999 
Mr Loren D Martin 
Martin & Nelson 
139 East on South Temple, Suite 400 
P.O Box 11590 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0590 
Re: The Almon J. Flake Family Trust 
Your client: Marian R. Flake 
Dear Mr. Martin: 
I have enclosed a copy of the Settlement Agreement that your client agreed to. Although 
your client never signed the agreement, my client paid the debts your client requested be paid 
immediately to protect her from creditor problems. Therefore, I expect your client to fulfill her 
part of the agreement. 
I am not sure what questions your client has but I recommend that you instruct her to 
follow the terms of the agreement and to not dispose of any personal property that belongs to 
Almon. I have also enclosed a copy of the letter I mailed to your client before you notified me 
that you were representing her. 
Very truly yours, 
David Ray Carver 
cc: Joel A. Flake, Trustee 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 
I EXHIBIT NO. 1 





The following parties agree to this settlement agreement as resolving all of the below 
issues and all claims that Marian R. Flake may have against the estate of Almon J Flake or The 
AJmon J Flake Family Trust dated September 22, 1987 (hereinafter the "Trust") 
1 Marian R. Flake is the surviving spouse of .AJmon J Flake She resides at 604 East 540 
North, Centerville, Utah 84014 
2. Joel A. Flake is the current Trustee of The .Almon J Flake Family Trust .All information 
concerning the Trust should be sent to him at 1913 West 500 North, Provo, Utah 84601 
3 On April 14, 1999, Marian R. Flake and her attorney, David J Crapo, meet with Joel A. 
Flake (the Trustee) and David Ray Carver (the attorney for the Trustee) along with three 
of the other children of AJmon J. Flake The only child not present was Vicki Lynn Flake. 
4. The Trust has already distributed the Cadillac to Marian R. Flake pursuant to Article IX 
paragraph C of the Trust. 
5. The Trust shall manage the home as provided in Article IX paragraph D of the Trust 
wherein it states the following: 
D. Marian R. Flake. If Marian R. Flake survives me, the main part of my home 
(located at 604 East 540 North in Centerville) shall be held in a separate trust as a life 
estate for her benefit. The Trust shall pay the following costs associated with the 
property: property insurance, property taxes, electricity, heating fuel, water, and other 
city utilities. Marian R. Flake shall pay all other costs associated with the property 
including telephone charges and maintenance and upkeep costs. However, the Trustee 
shall have discretion to pay such part or all of the maintenance costs of the home that the 
Trustee feels is appropriate. 
1. The Trustee may rent out the basement apartment to generate funds to 
take care of the costs of the home. The Trustee may also use such other funds in 
the Trust as may be necessary to take care of the costs of the home. 
2. This life estate will terminate at the earlier of the death of Marian R. 
Flake, her moving from the home, her remarriage or cohabitation, or her prior 
failure to pay her share of the costs associated with the property. 
3. At the termination of this life estate this trust shall be distributed as 
provided in paragraph E below. 
6. The Trust agreed to pay the following debts in the approximate amount as follows: 
Davis Schools Credit Union S2,100.00 ($1,981.97 balance paid 4-15-99) 
ZCMI $1,371.23 ($1,272.96 balance paid 4-16-99) 
Mervyn's $ 168 49 ($324.37 balance paid 4-16-99) 
Target $ 682.31 To be paid when Marion informs Trustee of 
account number. 
7 Marian R Flake agreed to immediately close all of the accounts listed in paragraph 6 
8 Marian R Flake will file a joint tax return for the tax years 1998 and 1999 Anv savings 
resulting by filing the joint tax return will be retained by the Trust 
9 Marian R Flake will assign ownership of the funeral plan to the Trust The Trust will 
maintain a funeral plan to take care of her reasonable funeral expenses 
10 Marian R Flake will assign to the Trust ownership of CUNA Mutual Life Insurance 
Policy No JV3013314 The Trust may pay the premiums and receive the proceeds to 
reimburse the trust for some of the expenses the Trust paid on her behalf 
11 The electricity to the barn shall be disconnected Marian R Flake may keep storage items 
in the upper part of the barn but she does so at her own risk due to the condition of the 
barn The Trust may keep items in the bottom part of the barn at its own risk 
12 In an effort to avoid needless confusion after the death of Marian R Flake, she will make a 
list of personal property items that will disclose who she feels owns the listed personal 
property items The Trustee (representing the children of Almon J Flake) will have the 
opportunity to make any additions to the list and to state any reason that they believe the 
ownership of the item should be different that as stated The list of personal property 
items will disclose the following 
(1) her separate property, 
(2) the separate property of Almon J Flake, and 
(3) the joint property of Marian R Flake and Almon J Flake (which will be divided 
equally by their two families after Marian dies) 
13 If Marian R Flake discovers any additional records of Almon J Flake she shall release the 
records to the Trustee 
14 In consideration for the above payments made by the Trust, Marian R Flake hereby 
releases any other claim she may have been able to make against the estate of Almon J 
Flake or The Almon J Flake Family Trust dated September 22, 1987 including anv rights 
that she might have had under the provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code 
